Mr. Pappé spoke and read from his book, *The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied Territories*, then was joined in conversation with Dima Khalidi.

**Transcript of Mr. Pappé’s Reading:**

As some of you may be aware, there is a new and exiting development in the study of Israel and Palestine and this is the application of the settler colonial model to the case study of Israel and Palestine.

What is SC? We make a distinction between settler colonialism and classical colonialism. The Settler colonialists are Europeans who were forced to leave Europe due to persecution or a sense of existential danger and who settled in someone else’s homeland. They were at first assisted by Empires, but soon rebelled against them as they wished to re-define themselves as new nations.

Their main obstacle however were not their empires but the native population. And they acted according to what Patrick Wolfe scholar called ‘the logic of the elimination of the native’. At times this led to a genocide, as happened here, at times to Apartheid as occurred in south Africa. In Palestine, the presence of native population led to the ethnic cleansing operation of the 1948 Nakba and ever since. The settlers also saw themselves as the indigenous and perceived the indigenous as aliens.

The paradigm explains well what lay behind the ethnic cleansing operations in 1948. Regardless of the quality of the Palestinian leadership, the ability or inability of the Arab world to help, the genuine or cynical wish of the Western world to compensate for the Holocaust, Zionism was a classical settler colonial movement that wanted a new land without the people who lived on it. Hence, long before the Holocaust the Zionist settlers acted upon the logic of the elimination of then native and 1948 provided the opportunity for partial realization of the vision of a de-Arabized Palestine.

However, in 1948, “only” half the indigenous population was expelled and Israel succeeded in taking over 78% of the coveted new homeland (a homeland demanded by the secular Jewish settler movement, Zionism by using a sacred religious text, the bible, as a scientific proof for their right to national sovereignty in the land and hence the Palestinians were the usurpers who took it over – the first setters who came in between 1882 and 1914 could have not made it in Palestine without the help of the local Palestinians, but in their diaries and letters back home they described their local hosts as the foreigners who usurped our ancient homeland and destroyed it). The inability to get rid of all the Palestinians and the takeover of most, but not all, of the land is an incompletion that explains the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians ever since 1948.
This is the background for the harsh policy towards the Palestinians left within Israel, the 1948 Arabs as they are named by the Palestinians or the Israeli Arabs as they are referred to by Israel. Until 1956, this community was subjected to further ethnic cleansing operations – dozens of villages were expelled, in them lived people regarded as citizens of the Jewish state whose declaration of Independence promised to protect them, and yet they were expelled by the settler state.

Then they were put under a harsh military rule that robbed them of any normality in their life, where soldiers could arrest, shoot or banish them at will. The settler colonial state saw its Arab citizens as aliens with a potential of become hostile aliens at any given moment.

The settler colonial paradigm explains also the Israeli policy leading to the June 1967 war as well its policy in the early years of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the book, the Israeli occupation itself, during the few days in early June 1967 is not described as it would be in most history book as a defensive response to an all Arab attack, but rather an Israeli solution to the incompletion of the 1948 operations.

The paradigm of settler colonialism also offers an explanation for the major decisions Israel took after the war, decisions that expose why there was no chance from the beginning for any peace process based on a two state solution. More than anything else for me it exposed the Israeli perception of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as two huge mega prisons that by now a third generation of hundreds of thousands of Israelis is involved in policing and maintaining as a way of life that looks to them as normal and acceptable, while the rest of us look with disgust, horror and dismay at this brutality and inhumanity imposed on millions of Palestinians incarcerated in these mega prisons and their only crime is that they are Palestinians. Nowhere in the world such mega prison exists, and yet, Israel until today has been absolved for this inhuman monstrosity it created in 1967 and still maintains today.

The settler state needed the remaining 22%, as the borders of 1948 were deemed indefensible and moreover, the ancient biblical sites in the West Bank were deemed as the heart of the ancient Land of Israel without which the new nation state would not thrive. In a recent book, The Biggest Prison on Earth, I describe how from 1948 onwards, important sections of the Israeli political and military elite planned the takeover of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The plans moved into a more practical stage when in 1963 the principal politician, who objected to such a takeover, David Ben-Gurion was removed from political life.

The book thus begins in many way in 1963, when a group of senior officers and officials drew a plan, called the Shaham plan, that would be implemented in 1967, to abolish the military rule imposed on the Palestinians inside Israel and moving this apparatus and impose it on the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza strip after their planned occupation.

[first reading from the book]

**Preface: One Hill, Two Prisons and Three Agencies**

**The University on the Hill**

*Givat Ram, the hill of Ram, is a sprawling, hilly neighbourhood on the very western edge of present-day Jerusalem. Various government ministries,*
including the Knesset, part of the Hebrew University, and the Bank of Israel, are located there. Israelis of a certain age, ethnic origin and socio-economic background developed a very nostalgic attitude towards the place. The hill makes a very brief and pastoral appearance in Amos Oz’s first and famous novel My Michael published in 1968: ‘where a small herd of sheep graze alongside the Prime Minister’s Office’. There are no sheep in sight today and the grazing fields of yester years are long gone. They were replaced by an elaborate system of highways, metal gates, hanging bridges and quite a beautiful rose garden.

It is very unlikely that sheep were to be seen anywhere near the Prime Minister’s Office when Oz’s book was published in 1968. But sheep did graze this hill when the Palestinian rural neighbourhood Sheikh al-Badr was standing there. Few of its houses are still there today next to the Crown Plaza Hotel, frequented by Israeli members of Knesset who do not live in Jerusalem. This village was gradually swollen by the city and became an urban neighbourhood until it was ethnically cleansed by the Israeli forces in 1948. It was a famous spot in the city as it overlooked one of Jerusalem’s most renowned landmarks: the Valley of the Cross. Tradition has it that there stood the tree providing the wood for Christ’s cross and this is why on that alleged spot Greek Orthodox monks built an impressive monastery, still there today, caged between new Jewish neighbourhoods and inlay roads.

West of the monastery today lies one of the two main campuses of the Hebrew university in Jerusalem. It is built on Sheikh al-Badr’s confiscated land sold to the university by the Israeli custodian of absentee lands (allegedly kept pending a decision about its future, but in reality sold to any Jewish individual or enterprise willing to pay a ridiculous low price for it). The university until 1967 operated on Mt. Scopus, which became ‘no man’s land’ and therefore inaccessible. After the June 1967 war, many of the Givat Ram Campus’ departments were transferred to the old new campus of Mt. Scopus, which was expanded significantly over confiscated Palestinian land.

At the same time the Givat Ram Campus was built, and north of it, a new site for the Israeli government was erected. Whereas the buildings of the campus were modest in appearance and were soon covered by pleasant lawns and greenery, it seems that the serene charm of this hilltop did not inspire the architects who built the governmental site of the Jewish State. With very little attention to the pastoral scenery or the biblical heritage they opted for huge lumps of cements spread all over the hill, wounding the natural beauty of this crest of the Jerusalem mountains.
In the summer of 1963, a group of unusual students were enrolled on this campus for a month long course. They were almost all with legal background of one sort or another. Some of them were members of the military administration that was running the areas in which the 1948 Palestinians (the Israeli Arabs as they were called then) lived under a strict rule that robbed them of most of their basic rights. Others were officers in the legal section of the Israeli army or officials of the Ministry of Interior and one or two were private lawyers.

They were invited by the department of Political Science in the Hebrew University. It was a month long course and included lectures on military rule in general and on the political situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in particular. There was also a discussion held about lessons to be learned from Israel’s military rule in the Sinai and Gaza in 1956 and inside Israel since 1948. A short introduction to 'Islam' was also part of the curriculum and it ended with a lecture on the 1948 ethnic cleansing of Jerusalem (obviously not described like this by the lecturer who probably referred to is the Yevusi operation of April 1948), in which scores of Palestinian villages were expelled and wiped out. This was followed by 'a celebratory meal and everyone was in an excellent mood', reported one of the participants.

Their presence on Givat Ram in 1963 was part of an overall new military strategy initiated by the Israeli Chief of the General Staff. The strategy was presented by the CoGS to the army on May 1, 1963 and was meant to prepare the army for the need to run the West Bank and the Gaza Strip occupied military areas. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip of course were not yet occupied, but the fact the four years before the actual occupation the Israeli military was ready with a judicial and administrative infrastructure for ruling the lives of one million Palestinians is highly significant.

Already four years before the actual takeover, it was clear that with the coveted new territory, the settler state would have new demographic problems. Like all settler colonial movements before them: space and people where the two main factors troubling the future of a settler colony. The more territory you get the more natives you have. How to eliminate them was the issue, and the answer and methods depended on the capacity, circumstances and the ability of the indigenous population to resist.

In the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war, the decision of how to engage with the new territory while solving the new demographic challenge to the settler state rested with the 13th government of Israel. It was the most consensual government Israel ever had or will have.
Every shade of Zionism and Jewish orthodox anti-Zionism were represented in this unity government. This explains its ability to carve out a strategy that is still adhered to, today.

It is based on several decisions. The first one was not to annex officially the new territories, but also never give the up as part of the space of the future Jewish state. This is how the geography, the space, issue was solved. As for the population, after some hesitations and quite substantial forced transfer of population, it was decided not to ethnically cleanse the population. The status of the population was to have some official connection with the previous powers, namely Jordan and Egypt, but basically as the Minister of Defence defined the new inhabitants of the greater Israel, they will be citizenless citizens. A worried Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban, inquired how long can people live in such a condition, ‘oh, Dayan answered, for at least 50 years.

The next decision was not to announce these decisions and engage in a peace process, with the help of the Americans, the aim of which was to obtain international, and if possible an Arab, and later on even Palestinian, legitimization or at least consent to the way Israel wishes to have the territory without the people and also demands that this would be the basis for a future peace process. It was taken for granted that there will be genuine public debate in Israel about the future of the territories and some friction with the USA, but in the end of the day, the Israeli interpretation of what is peace and what is a solution will prevail. Nothing in what happened in the next 52 years indicate that these politicians did not get it right basing their hope on Palestinian fragmentation, Arab impotence, American immunity and global indifference.

The method of having the land without people and calling this arrangement, peace, was devised in the month of June 1967. The Labour party, still dominating Israeli and Zionist politics, always believed that some land can be conceded for the sake of demographic purity, hence they were enchanted by the colonialist idea of partition, which alas quite a few Palestinians fell for over the years. Partitioning the new occupied territories was the way forward, between a Jewish West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a Palestinian one.

The first partition map was offered by Yigal Allon, one of the leaders of the Labour government. The Jewish space would be determined, he said in June 1967, by colonization. He drew a strategic map that left only densely populated Palestinian areas out of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Strip. The problem for the 13th government and the ones that followed it, the Golda Meir and Rabin governments, was the new messianic movement, Gush Emunim, had a different map of colonization, based on the bible and the nationalistic imagination of Israeli archaeologists, which wanted to settle Jews precisely on densely populated Palestinian areas. This twin effort from above and below already by 1974 defined the West Bank in particular as a partitioned space between a Jewish West Bank and a Palestinian one. The former growing all the time, the latter shrinking all the time.

The other constituent element of the settle colonial policy after 1967 was how to rule and police the citizenless citizens. In that last 52 years, the settler state employed two models for running millions of citizenless citizens. Both models are mega prison models, with the logic of a prison and with only one difference, you can leave the prison and become a refugee with no right of return.

The open prison model is based on allowing freedom of movement inside the Palestinian areas and a controlled movement outside the Palestinian areas and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. No spatial growth for the Palestinians, no new villages or towns built on
any land coveted for present and future Jewish settlements. No resistance to the geopolitical reality imposed by Israel and a certain level of autonomy in running municipal affairs.

The first open prison was run between 1967 and 1987. Life was constantly monitored by the army and since 1981 by an outfit called the civil administration ruled by a set of regulations that gave the military unlimited power in the life of the citizenless citizens. They were arrested without trial, expelled, their houses and business demolished, wounded and killed at the discretion of soldiers quite often of lower ranks.

This was on offer between 1967 to 1987 for the first time and then between 1993 and 2000 for the second time. It is on offer for areas A and B in the West Bank since 2004. Every new model of an open prison is worse for ‘the inmates’ than the previous one. Privileges granted in the first term are reduced as long term punishment for resisting the model. Remember this is the world of jailer and warden and this part of that reality. Thus, the second open prison, what one can call the open prison model of the Oslo accord which created mini prisons in areas A, B and C and the Gaza Strip, is far less open that the one in tact until Oslo. This didactic approach is inbuilt into the Israeli perception – supported by Israeli orientalists – how best to teach the Palestinian lessons that would docile them and disempower them to the point of submission.

The first Palestinian resistance to the open prison model was in the first intifada in 1987. The punishment was replacing the open prison model with a Maximum-security prison. Between 1987 and 1993, it included short term punitive actions – mass arrests without trial, wounding and killing demonstrators, massive demolition of houses, shut down of business and the education system and most importantly, further expropriation of land for sake of Jewish settlements.

[a second reading from the book]

**The Calendar of the Occupation**

A more diluted form of a closure was the curfew imposed by the army for few days on towns and villages and during Jewish festivals on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a whole. This kind of action began in 1967 in the early days of the occupation and continued on a daily basis. I chose only one year, 1993, on the very eve of the Oslo accord, so as to show what kind of a reality the accord promised, and utterly failed, to change. As one NGO monitoring the curfew policy noted ‘every Palestinian living in the Occupied Territories had spent an average of 10 weeks under in house curfew’.²

The worst day in the calendar of the occupation, apart from the aftermath of a particularly daring or violent operation by on the Palestinian factions, were the three days around Israel day of independence (celebrated according to the Hebrew calendar and that in 1993 fell in April).

The town of Khan Yunis in the Gaza strip, like all the other towns and villages in the West Bank and the Strip, was put under military curfew for three days. This
short period was enough for the army to perform its routine devastation. Muhammad Ahmad al-Astal, who was 24 years old tell then, recalled how the soldiers burst into the house where his friends usually gathered; about ten men all in all. The soldiers took four of them to another room. He remained with three other members of the family. Two of those were taken by the soldiers to the room’s corner and were beaten with the rifles’ stocks; they were punched, slapped and kicked. He was ordered with another family member to empty the cupboard from all it contains: clothing and other household stuff.

Here is the rest of tale in his words:

The soldiers called me, slapped me on the face and told me. ‘You are Hamas’. I returned to empty the cupboards but I was called again this time they told me “you are Islamic Jihad” and slapped me again’.

There was a third round where he was called ‘you are a PLO’. Another man in the room was treated in a similar way. Then they were both summoned: ‘one soldier held me by the neck and banged our heads against each other’.

In turned out that in the next room the same abuse was taken place and then they were united with two men from the other room and ordered to stand facing the wall with their hands stretched in the air: The soldiers gave us back our ID card to hold up in the air and told us to remain like this’. After half an hour the older members of the family told them the soldiers left.  

Hassan Abd al-Sayidi Abu Labada, 29 years old married with two children, also resident of Khan Yunis, was woken up by the soldiers at 2am in the morning with punch into his face from a soldier’s rifle, followed by additional blows. His brother Mannar, 23 years old, was taken out of his bed and thrown at the family’s car, parked at the yard. The soldiers asked about the whereabouts of Abu Samahadna, whom he had not known at all. This led to more punches direct to his eyes followed by the usual routine of a forced emptying of one’s cupboard. The soldiers tore with a knife the sofa. And in his own words:

They found a kitchen knife in the kitchen. ‘What is it?’, ‘it is a bread knife’, I answered. The soldiers punched me with the knife on the nose, I was wounded and bled. The soldier took a sack of rice and demanded that I empty it on the floor. I said it was only rice, so he emptied it himself and then took an oil tin and poured it on the cloths and the rice. They left, nobody was arrested nothing taken.
Fatmah Hassan Tabashe Sufian, was 61 years old, married and a mother of four and she was woken up on 6 April 1993 at 3am in the morning. The soldiers broke into her house and pushed her towards the wall and asked her where her children were; they were asleep she replied. They woke up her son Saad, 30 years old, kicking him and beating him with their hand and rifle’s stock, until he was spitting blood all over the place. Her other son Ibrahim was badly beaten, and the B’Tselem researcher who took her evidence, testified that long after the incident, he could still see ecchymosis stains on his back. Both sons were taken out to the yard and stationed against a wall. The soldiers found two toy guns and began slashing the two with it until the toy broke. Then they gathered everyone in the complex, twenty seven persons in one room, threw in a shock grenade. Saad and Ibrahim were ordered to empty the cupboard while they were continuously beaten by the soldiers, shouting at them ‘you are Hamas and we are Golani [the name of the military brigade to which they belonged]. They did not spare a blind old brother in last of Fatmah, 100 years old who was abused by the soldiers throwing mattresses and blankets at him.⁶

Thus every April from 1987 until 1993 this was the routine of the collective punishment. But it was not only these three days that mattered. Collective punishment in march-may 1993 robbed 116,000 Palestinian workers from their source of living; bisected the occupied territories into four disconnected areas and as noted barred any access to Jerusalem.⁷ Seen from that perspective, when the Oslo accord was implemented as territorial and security arrangement, it was just official confirmation for a policy already in place since 1987.

The Palestinian were offered a sophisticated open prison model in Oslo (regardless of how Palestinians and the world saw the accord). This is why the end of the occupation is not mentioned in the accord and the accord did not promise any end to intensive Israeli involvement in the life of the Palestinians, even if the Palestinians would implement every other Israel demand within the Oslo accord.

However, this model included the long-term punishment, the didactic one. Since 1994 there was no freedom movement any more inside the Palestinian areas, let alone outside the Palestinian areas and the Judaization of the West Bank increased. The Gaza Strip was encircled already in 1994 with a barbered wire and the privilege granted in the first model of the open prison for the Gazans to work in Israel was withdrawn. Another permanent punishment was the allocation of more water to the Gush Qafif settlements and cutting the strip into two parts controlled by Israel.
Article Forty of the Oslo accord was supposed to increase the water resources available to the Palestinians by almost 30 mcm, but only a third of this promise quota was given. Even that additional quantity was lost in a policy of permits which controlled and distributed water as means of reward and punishment in the mega prison – where the Palestinian drinking water networks and ability to drill well depended on the Israeli good will. Moreover, the Israel national water company, Mekorot, tapped by the end of the century into mountain aquifers due to the drought and continued to do so in times of water shortages while the Palestinians were prohibited from doing so, even for agricultural purposes. Another problem Palestinians face is Israel’s demolition of water-harvesting storage pools. According to the Palestine Report:

For example, in the Hebron areas of Aroub and near the Israeli settlement Kiryat Arba, some farmers tried to build storage tanks to collect rainwater, but the Israeli authorities destroyed them.8

Palestinians are faced with the growing problem of pollution from water waste coming from Israeli settlements. These settlements dump their wastewater, especially industrial waste, into Palestinian lands. This polluted both agricultural lands and groundwater. As the report on which we rely for this description notes clearly the ‘contamination of water resources by residential and commercial development can have a deleterious effect on public health’.9 The Israeli daily, Ma’ariv reported that Palestinian children near prosperous settlements fell ill because they lacked water and suffered from poor hygiene.10 Tests carried in various parts discovered high level of bacteria, nitrates and other hazardous industrial impurities and as there was no alternative water sources the population had to use these sources with incredible risk to their lives. Palestinian health officials estimate that in between 1994 and 1999, 66,000 people were hospitalized with water-pollution-related illnesses, and another 290,000 sought outpatient care.11

When Palestinian villagers attempted in November 1999 to build a sand barrier to stop such a flow from the Jewish colony in Gaza, Kfar Darom, they were prevented by the Israeli army from doing so. The waste water
brought with them a dramatic increase in the number of mosquitoes and other insects and contagious diseases, particularly skin disease among children. In 1999, in several cases these water waste burst through dams and submerged cultivated land and at times even houses. In 2001, such an implosion was so dramatic that it was widely reported in the world. Some poetic justice occurred in the Winter of 2012/2013 when the water burst the apartheid wall near a Jewish settlement (inside the green line), Bat Hefer and flooded the houses. I do not mean that anyone drove satisfaction from watching Israelis suffering a similar fate but just that when you corrupt the land as an invader, nature turns to be blind to nationality or ethnic identity.¹²

The ecological damage of the occupation transpired towards the end of the century in other aspects of life. The settlements brought with them industries – aluminium, leather tanning, textile dyeing, batteries, fiberglass, plastic and similar chemical industries whose waste is dumped near the Palestinian villages. Solid wastes from Israeli industrial zones were routinely dumped in Palestinian areas. Wadi Beit Hanoun, for example, is the receptacle for wastes from the nearby Erez industrial zone. A report by Palestinian Ministry of Environment stated that, since 1987, Israel dumped solid waste in the Azzoun area near Qalqilia, leading to a marked increase in dangerous diseases such as cancer among the Palestinians in the area. The report reviewed the many attempts to smuggle Israeli solid waste into the Palestinian land. The report also warned against the Israeli attempts to relocate factories causing environmental hazards from within Israel into West Bank settlements and pointed out that 40 out of the 160 factories in the settlements pose real environmental hazards.¹³

If life under the first model of open prison was unacceptable to the Palestinians, the second one was worse, both in objective terms but even more importantly as it was presented as part of a peace process. The years devoted to Oslo and its implementation were creating life under conditions which were far worse than those in the first open prison model.

The second uprising generated yet again a punitive maximum-security model: far worse in its short term punitive actions and the long term punishments. The massive use of military power, included F-16 and tanks against civilian population in particular during the 2002 Defence Shield operation. An urbancide we had witnessed in Syria, Iraq and Yemen recently and which was a
prelude for the use of such power in the third model of the maximum security prison imposed on Gaza after the Hamas took over the strip in 2006.

In 2007 the two models clearly transpired in the way Israel ruled the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, still loyal to the main decision the 13th government took in 1967: not to annex, not to expel and not to withdraw. The only decision discarded was the need to present it all as temporary measures pending peace, or to describe the open prison model as a peace plan. Even the Israeli public and politicians got tired from this charade and adopted what Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called unilateralism. Where there is collaboration there is an open prison model, in areas A and B, which include the long-term punitive actions: hundreds of checkpoints and an apartheid wall meant to humiliate to the point of submission millions of people under the belief that this would discourage a third uprising. The checkpoints are the recruiting ground for a cruel network of informants that is meant to attack the dignity and self-respect on a whole nation that miraculously still succeeds in reaming human and steadfast today. And the closure of whole towns and villages with only one exit controlled day and night by the army and recently by private companies.

Where there is resistance as in the Gaza Strip the maximum security, prison has turned into a ghetto, with Israel rationing food and calories, undermining the health and economy to the point of creating a human catastrophe as acknowledged by the UN prediction for the development and unsustainability of the Gaza Strip from next year onwards.

The military punishment is no other than a set of war crimes and incremental genocide of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. This is achieved by dehumanizing the Palestinians, including children depicting them as soldiers in an enemy’s army that can legally be targeted by the army as enemy forces (this was the same doctrine used in the Nakba - a village was an army base, a neighbourhood an army outpost and whoever lived in them were enemy soldiers, not men, women and children).

All the Zionist parties of Israel in one form or another subscribe to these two models as the only game in town. The dominant political powers in Israel wish to import this twin model into Israel proper, vis-à-vis the Palestinians in Israel and they might succeed in doing so and the newly passed nationality law is an indication that this is indeed the future policy.

The only way of stopping it is first to recognize the settler colonial nature of Israel and as a result to understand that what is needed is not peace but decolonization, not just of the areas occupied in 1967, but of the whole of historical Palestine, one which will include the implementation of the Palestinian refugees right of return.

Secondly, we should revisit the two state solution as an open prison model and think hard how can one create one democratic state for all; taking into account two things. One that the representative bodies of the Palestinians until today still subscribe to the two states solutions and secondly that there is already one Stettler apartheid Israel all over historical Palestine. Ergo we need a Palestinian change of mind, and international endorsement and BDS of such a way forward and then we might even succeed with generating a change from within the Jewish society. When all these elements will be in place, there is a hope for the torn country and its people.
Footnotes from *The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied Territories*


3 Ibid.

Jamal Abu Samahanda was the founder of the Popular Resistance Committees in the Rafah area in Gaza until he was assassinated by the Israelis in 2006 for his involvement in military actions against them.

4 *B’Teselem, op. cit.*

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 October 1999

United Nation Archives, UN General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, A/55/84- E/2000/16, 11

11 14 June 2000

12 BBC News, 26 March, 2001

13 Palestine Ministry of Information Factsheet, 30 October 1999